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et al.: Right To Cross-Examine

RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE
N.Y CoNST. art.I, § 6
In any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be
allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel as in
civil actions and shall be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation and be confrontedwith the witnesses againsthim ....
U.S. CONST. amend. VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right.., to be confrontedwith the witnesses againsthim ....
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
SECOND DEPARTMENT
People v. Peredal
(decided January 31, 1994)
Defendant claimed that his right to cross-examine was violated
when the trial court limited the cross-examination of a
complainant, despite the well-recognized fact that the defendant's
right to cross-examine a witness was protected by the Federal 2
and State 3 Constitutions.

1. 200 A.D.2d 774, 607 N.Y.S.2d 98 (2d Dep't 1994).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides in relevant
part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him... ." Id.
3. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. This provision provides in relevant part: "In
any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear
and defend in person and with counsel as in civil actions and shall be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation and be confronted with the witnesses
against him... ." Id.
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The reported facts of Pereda are sparse and vague. The
defendant, Pereda, was convicted at a jury trial of rape and
assault. 4 Additionally, the court's decision leads the reader to
infer that the defendant was also involved with the complainants
in civil litigation, 5 and that Pereda'scross-examination issue may
have pertained to the interest that the complainants could have
had in the outcome of the criminal trial. 6 The court, however,
held that the latter issue was too remote to permit crossexamination on the subject.7
The Pereda court agreed with the lower court's limitation on
the defendant's right to cross-examine, reasoning that "trial
courts retain wide discretion to limit cross-examination" 8 for
various concerns, such as when interrogation confuses the issues
or when it is only of minimal relevance. 9 The court also
explained that the issue of relevancy, or rather, whether the
evidence is too remote, "is a question for the court." 10 In other
words, whether an issue is relevant is determined by the trial
judge, rather than the factf'mders.
The basis of a defendant's right to cross-examine a witness is
found in the United States Constitution and the New York State
Constitution, both of which confer the right to confront witnesses
who are testifying against a defendant. 11 This right, however, is
4. Pereda, 200 A.D.2d at 774, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 99.
5. Id. at 775, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 100. The court made reference to

evidence in the jury's possession concerning civil lawsuits in which the
complainants were involved. Id.
6. Id. at 774, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 99.
7. Id. at 774, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 99-100. Aside from affirming the lower
court's limitation of defendant's cross-examination, the appellate court denied
the defendant's motion to suppress his post-arrest statements. Id. at 774, 607
N.Y.S.2d at 99. Additionally, the appellate court also denied his request for a
jury charge that the complainants were interested witnesses, stating that the
jury had already been appropriately charged and, in concluding, dismissed
Pereda's remaining contentions in light of his overwhelming guilt. Id. at 775,
607 N.Y.S.2d at 100.

8. Id. at 774, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 99.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 774, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 100.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol11/iss3/59

2

et al.: Right To Cross-Examine

19951

RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE

1081

not necessarily absolute in its application, 12 and the denial of
confrontation does not automatically mandate reversal of a
13
defendant's conviction.
A recent New York case which synthesized federal and state
precedent on the right to cross-examination is People v.
Ashner, 14 in which the defendant successfully appealed her
conviction of grand larceny and twenty-five counts of forgery
because there was a reasonable possibility that the court's
limitation on her right to cross-examine a witness led to her
conviction.1-5
One consideration stated in Pereda was whether the evidence

obtained through a cross-examination is too remote. 16 In People
12. Pereda, 200 A.D.2d at 774, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 99. The court stated that
cross-examination may be limited "'based on concerns about, among other
things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or
interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.'" Id. (quoting
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673., 679 (1986)).
13. See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684 (holding that the denial of crossexamination of a prosecution witness to show bias violated defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights subject to harmless-error analysis); People v. Ashner, 190
A.D.2d 238, 246, 597 N.Y.S.2d 975, 980 (2d Dep't 1993) (holding that the
lower court erred by limiting cross-examination of a witness through the use of
harmless-error analysis).
In People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 326 N.E.2d 787, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213
(1975), the New York Court of Appeals distinguished the federal and state
tests for harmless error. The federal harmess-error test examined the proof of
the defendant's guilt and the effect the error had on the verdict. Id. at 241-43,
326 N.E.2d 793-94, 367 N.Y.S.2d 221-23. The New York harmless-error
test, however, which is applied to non-constitutional issues, places greater
weight on the proof of the defendant's guilt - which can render an error
harmless where a defendant's guilt is overwhelming. Id. The Pereda court
points to the "overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt," Pereda, 200
A.D.2d at 775, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 100, but does so in relation to the defendant's
"remaining contentions," not referring to his right to cross-examine. Id.
14. 190 A.D.2d 238, 597 N.Y.S.2d 975 (2d Dep't 1993) (holding that it
was not harmless error to limit cross-examination where there may have been
a motive to falsely testify).
15. Id. at 248-49, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 982.
16. Pereda, 200 A.D.2d at 774, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 99-100. See JEROME
PRINCE, RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE 117 (10th ed. 1973) ("Evidence, although

technically relevant, will be excluded if it is too slight, remote, or conjectural
to have any legitimate influence in determining the fact in issue. And the
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v. Feldman,17 the court reversed a conviction where the
defendant was prevented from discrediting an expert witness'
statements. 18 The court held that the question of "[w]hether

evidence is 'too remote'

. .

is a question for the court ....

"19

Feldman is but one of five New York state cases the Pereda court

cites in support of its decision to uphold the limitation placed on
the defendant's right to cross-examine. 2 0 The other cases equally

support the premise that if testimony or evidence is too remote or
conjectural, the court may limit the cross-examination concerning
21
that testimony or evidence.
Consistent with New York's interpretation, the United States

Supreme Court, in People v. Gordon,22 held that "this principle

[of wide judicial discretion to control cross-examination] cannot
be expanded to justify a curtailment which keeps from the jury
relevant and important facts bearing on the trustworthiness of
crucial testimony." 2 3

question whether the evidence is of such nature is for the court, not for the
jury.").
17. 299 N.Y. 153, 85 N.E.2d 913 (1949).
18. Id. at 169-70, 85 N.E.2d at 921.
19. Id. at 169, 85 N.E.2d at 921.
20. Pereda, 200 A.D.2d at 774, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 99.
21. See People v. Williams, 188 A.D.2d 382, 383, 591 N.Y.S.2d 390,
391 (1st Dep't 1992) ("Defendant's theory - that the mother, under the
influence of hallucinations, persuaded her daughter to fabricate charges against
him - was speculative and conjectural.. .

.");

People v. Arthur, 186 A.D.2d

661, 663, 588 N.Y.S.2d 881, 883 (2d Dep't 1992) (stating that the court's
discretion to limit defendant's cross-examination was upheld when defendant's
theory that police were under pressure to arrest him was a "remote
extrapolation"); People v. Frejomil, 184 A.D.2d 524, 525, 584 N.Y.S.2d 181,
182 (2d Dep't 1992) (holding that the court's limitation on defendant's crossexamination of his wife in regard to collateral matters was reasonable); People
v. Martinez, 177 A.D.2d 600, 601, 575 N.Y.S.2d 938, 939 (2d Dep't 1991)
(holding that it was proper to limit defendant's right to cross-examine because
defendant's theory that victim's mother might have unconsciously
communicated her suspicion that her daughter was having a sexual relationship
with defendant was too speculative).
22. 344 U.S. 414 (1952).
23. Id. at 423.
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Another common consideration made in determining the trial
court's discretion in limiting cross-examination, as noted in Davis
v. Alaska,24 is whether a witness was possibly motivated to
testify falsely against the defendant, which is weighed against the
value of the testimony. 25 In Davis, the juvenile witness had a
history of burglary 26 and the court theorized that the stolen safe,
which authorities had found near the witness' stepfather's house,
may have caused the witness to testify falsely to avoid being
named a suspect himself.2 7
Davis set a precedent which supports the right of a defendant to
cross-examine the witnesses against him. In Davis, the Court
stated:
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees the right of
an accused in a criminal prosecution "to be confronted with the
witnesses against him." This right is secured for defendants in
state as well as federal criminal proceedings. Confrontation
means more than being allowed to confront the witness
physically. "Our cases construing the [confrontation] clause hold
that a primary interest secured by it is the right of crossexamination."

28

The purpose of cross-examining a witness is to put before the

29
jury the facts from which it may infer the witness' reliability.

In conclusion, Pereda's right to confront the witness against
him was protected by both the Federal and State Constitutions
under the Confrontation Clause of each, but the right is not
absolute and can be limited by the discretion of the court
depending upon whether the court views the testimony as too
remote and whether an appeal based on a violation of that right to

24. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
25. Id. at 311.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 310-14.
28. Id. at 353 (citations omitted). See People v. Ashner, 190 A.D.2d 238,

246, 597 N.Y.S.2d 975, 982 (2d Dep't 1993) ("The right of cross-examination
is included in the federal and state constitutional right of the accused to
confront the witnesses against her.").
29. Delavare, 475 U.S. at 679.
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cross-examine will be viewed as harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.
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